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Aid, Rents and the Politics of the Budget Process
Andrés Mejía Acosta and Paolo de Renzio
Summary
This paper analyses the impact of political institutions and budgetary procedures
on budget governance in aid- and resource-dependent countries. The notion of
budget governance refers to the quality of budget outcomes, such as the
governments’ ability to produce sustainable public finances over time, make
efficient use of government spending, and represent the preferences of citizens.
While the paper discusses some of the challenges of measuring budget
governance in aid and resource dependent countries, the empirical analysis
focuses on one aspect of budget governance: the extent to which countries can
produce sustainable fiscal balances over time. For this purpose, we have produced
a new dataset of 47 low and lower middle income countries whose economies
depend on aid or natural resource inflows between 1995 and 2006. The analysis
builds on indicators of party competition and democracy, good governance,
budgetary processes and institutions, and aid and resource dependency.
Preliminary findings suggest that greater executive power is positively associated
with improved fiscal performance in resource dependent countries, but this is also
associated with lower levels of party competition and democracy. Conversely,
greater levels of aid dependency are inversely associated with both executive
power and fiscal performance.
Keywords: budget process; fiscal outcomes; political institutions; aid effectiveness;
resource dependency; low income countries.
IDS WORKING PAPER 311
04
Andrés Mejía Acosta. Political Scientist whose research focuses on legislative
politics, budget politics, the policymaking process, informal institutions, and
democratic governance in Latin America and the Caribbean. His forthcoming book
is titled Informal Institutions and Policymaking in Latin America (Routledge 2009).
The current research project explores the formation of budget coalitions in
resource dependent Andean countries: Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. He has
collaborated with Club de Madrid, The Carter Center, Eurasia Group, Freedom
House, United Nations Development Fund and the Inter American Development
Bank.
Paolo de Renzio is LSE Fellow in the MPA Programme at the London School of
Economics, and a DPhil candidate in the Department of Politics and International
Relations at the University of Oxford. Previously, he worked as a Research Fellow
in the Centre for Aid and Public Expenditure at the Overseas Development
Institute, after six years working with Papua New Guinea’s Ministry of Finance,
and with UNDP in Mozambique. His research focuses on the interplay between
aid policies and modalities and public finance management systems in developing
countries.
Contents
Summary, keywords 3
Author notes 4
Acknowledgements 6
1 Introduction 7
2 The analytical framework 8
2.1 Measuring budget governance 8
2.2 Actors, institution and budget politics 9
2.3 Political institutions 11
2.4 Budget institutions 12
2.5 Aid, resource rents and the budget process 14
3 Measuring determinants of budget governance 17
3.1 Political institutions and good governance 18
3.2 Budget processes and institutions 19
3.3 Resource dependency indicators 20
4 Some preliminary findings 21
4.1 Budget governance and fiscal discipline 22
4.2 Directions for further research 23
5 Summary and conclusions 24
Appendix 26
References 30
Figures and tables
Figure 2.1 The budget governance framework 11
Table A.1 List of countries 26
Table A.2 Data sources on budget processes and institutions 27
Table A.3 Variable codebook and summary statistics 28
Table A.4 Political determinants of budget governance 29
IDS WORKING PAPER 311
05
IDS WORKING PAPER 311
06
Acknowledgements
A literature and data review prepared for the Department for International
Development (DfID, UK). We thank Carlos Santiso, Aaron Schneider, Verena
Fritz, Mick Moore and Marc Berenson for the comments and feedback received.
We acknowledge the valuable research assistance of Gustavo Bagattini, Liv
Bjornestad, Natalia Fingermann, and Geoff Handley.
This paper is published by the Development Research Centre for the Future
State, based at the Institute of Development Studies, UK.
Since 2000, the Future State DRC has been working together with a number of
international partnerships through research institutes in various countries. The
main focus of the Future State DRC is on the question of how public authority in
the South can best be reshaped and reconstituted to meet the challenge of poverty
reduction. For further information please visit: www.ids.ac.uk/futurestate/
.
IDS WORKING PAPER 311
07
1 Introduction
The budget process is, by its nature, a highly contentious policy arena where
diverse political actors converge to address distributional conflicts through
institutionalised and repeated interactions. Distributive concerns about resource
allocation are especially relevant where governments benefit from non-tax sources
of revenue such as rents from natural resource exploration and different kinds of
aid flows. While there are considerable differences between these two sources of
revenue, they both erode governments’ incentives to remain accountable to their
citizens’ policy preferences and spending priorities (Moore 2007). They also
contribute to eroding ‘horizontal’ accountability between the executive and other
government branches, as governments have greater incentives to make
discretionary use of unearned revenues bypassing the effective checks and
balances from control authorities and opposition parties.
The impact of aid and resource rents on the nature of ‘budget politics’ has been
approached from diverse research traditions, but there are no empirical
comparisons between types of budget outcomes in aid dependent and resource
dependent countries.
On the one hand, domestic policymakers, donors, and development agencies
have commissioned studies to understand the political drivers behind the budget
process in order to contribute to aid effectiveness and promote sound public
financial management reforms (de Renzio and Fritz 2005; Evans 2006; DFID
2007). With few exceptions that discussed the roles of informal institutions in the
budget process (Rakner et al. 2004), most of the work has focused on the
efficiency of aid flows and resource rents, and the formal roles of international aid
agencies (de Renzio 2006). Recent evaluations of general budget support
programmes and capacity building efforts in Africa (IDD and Associates 2006;
Levy and Kpundeh 2005) have raised relevant questions about the adoption of
budget reforms and their impact on domestic accountability, but failed to address
the underlying political determinants of these shortcomings. An alternative
approach to budget politics borrows from comparative political economy, focusing
on the roles of budgetary institutions (Scartascini and Filc 2005), mechanisms of
budget accountability (Santiso 2006), and the effects of political institutions and
constitutions (Stein et al. 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2005) on budget outcomes.
While the first type of institutional analysis builds on thick descriptions of country
experiences and case studies, mostly drawn from aid-dependent countries in
Africa, the second type builds on large-N country comparisons to assess the
relative impact of political institutions on fiscal performance, focusing mostly on
OECD and Latin American countries. This paper is a first step to bridge this
theoretical, methodological and empirical gap by exploring the political economy
effects of aid and rents on budget outcomes in developing countries. The dataset
contains observations for 47 low income and lower middle income countries that
have been aid dependent, resource dependent or both, between 1995 and 2006.
Given the colossal challenge of collecting complete and reliable data for the
countries of interest, the empirical part of the paper remains a work in progress.
Nevertheless, some preliminary findings help clarify the links between strong
executives and budget outcomes in aid and resource dependent economies.
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While the empirical evidence from OECD countries suggests that stronger
executive power is associated with improved fiscal outcomes, we find that this
relationship also applies to resource dependent countries, but the effect is
reversed when it comes to aid dependent countries, that is, aid recipient countries
tend to have poor fiscal performance even when (and perhaps because) the
executive has considerable powers over the policy process. Furthermore, findings
suggest that strong executives may be associated with improved fiscal
performance in resource dependent countries but at the expense of political
competition and rule of law. In other words, the paper lends some empirical
evidence to the claim that natural resource rents tend to erode democratic
competition and accountability in developing countries. Further empirical efforts
are required to tease out and evaluate the impact of different modalities of non-tax
revenues and their magnitude, on other dimensions of fiscal performance, including
for example, the effectiveness of government allocations.
This paper proceeds as follows. The first part reviews the existing literature and
proposes an analytical framework to understand the combined impact of political
and budgetary institutions on fiscal outcomes in aid-dependent and resource-
dependent economies. The second part begins to develop the empirical model by
explaining the criteria for case selection and making a comprehensive revision of
the independent variables, their measurement and sources. The third section
reports the results from the regression analysis looking at the combined impact of
political institutions, budget institutions and non-tax revenues on fiscal outcomes.
The final section summarises findings, discusses policy implications and identifies
an agenda for future research.
2 The analytical framework
2.1 Measuring budget governance
The budget process is, in essence, a political mechanism by which state actors
decide on relevant ways to effectively extract and reallocate resources from
society. The ability to extract taxes from its own people – as opposed to relying on
other sources of revenue – is a critical moment marking the birth of the modern
state. Tax collection has direct implications on the quality of representative
democracy, since it makes governments more accountable to the preferences of
payers; by contrast, accountability is likely to suffer when government finances do
not depend on taxpayers’ contributions but rather benefit from external aid flows
or natural resource rents (Brautigam et al. 2008; Gervasoni 2006; Moore 2004).
Through the budget process, the state is able to aggregate diverse preferences,
address distributive conflicts, protect the most vulnerable, enforce contracts over
time, and remain accountable to the will of the people. We propose the notion of
budget governance to analyse the existence of these qualitative-desirable-attributes
of the budget process. According to Schick (1998), there are three desirable
elements of a budget process: (a) aggregate fiscal discipline, or the aim of keeping
the balance between revenues and spending; (b) allocative efficiency, or the
objective of focusing spending on high priority areas and on more effective
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programmes; and (c) operational efficiency, or the need to ensure value for money
and a maximisation of impact.
Much of the literature on fiscal policy and fiscal behaviour relies on quantitative
measures of budget outcomes linked to indicators of fiscal discipline such as low
levels of fiscal deficits or government debt. For lack of a better measure given the
lack of reliable data, we keep our attention on the commonly used indicator of fiscal
balances as an indicator of budget sustainability or aggregate fiscal discipline,
which constitutes Shick’s first dimension. Evaluating allocative and/or operational
efficiency as an indicator of effective public spending is a difficult matter for several
reasons. First, for most countries in our sample we lack reliable sectoral data to
evaluate whether government spending on one sector is likely to produce better
returns on investment than spending on a different sector. Secondly, we lack the
disaggregated data to evaluate operational efficiency, that is, whether countries
obtain better development indicators for every dollar spent (value for money). For
example, the best available cross-country indicator of development outcomes, the
UN’s Human Development Index, reports comparable data for only three of the
12-year period covered by this study (1995, 2000 and 2004), thus undermining
the validity of resulting comparisons.
There are other dimensions of the budget process that deserve attention but were
ultimately not considered in this study. The notion of representativeness, or the
extent to which budget allocations represent the preferences of the majority of
citizens can be evaluated by measuring the gap between the legislative
representation of sub national units (i.e. provinces) and the territorial (provincial)
allocation of government spending (Snyder and Samuels 2001; Mejía et al. 2006).
To measure the coherence and credibility of government policies, Knack et al.
(2003) proposed a ‘budget volatility’ indicator which looks at the variability over
time of budgetary allocations. Finally, other indices and assessments such as the
Open Budget Index, the Global Integrity Index, the Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework and the World Bank’s Country Policy
and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which we will look at in more detail below, try
to capture not only of the nature and quality of budget processes, but also of
specific outcomes related to the functioning and effectiveness of budget
accountability mechanisms, such as parliamentary oversight, audit functions and
civil society involvement.
2.2 Actors, institutions and budget politics
The literature highlights two main explanations for the relation between budget
processes and budget outcomes. Political economy approaches have focused on
the impact of domestic political institutions and budgetary procedures in shaping
budget outcomes. Examples of such approaches look at the effects of different
electoral systems and political parties on fiscal discipline, the impact of government
cabinets and legislative coalitions, and the impact of budgetary norms and
procedures on budgets (Alesina et al. 1999; Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999;
Scartascini and Filc 2005). The fundamental claim coming from this literature is
that political institutions that tend to centralise decision making ability in the hands
of fewer policymakers are likely to induce more fiscal discipline than those
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institutions encouraging wider participation and inclusion of diverse interests. This
literature, however, is not sensitive to the fact that in many developing countries,
reforms that promoted greater centralisation of the budget process in the hands of
the executive, without ensuring adequate mechanisms for accountability, may
have increased executive discretion for political gain at the expense of fiscal
performance.
A second explanation looks at the impact of exogenous resource flows such as
resource rents or aid flows on budget processes and outcomes. Both resource
revenues and aid flows can be considered as ‘sovereign rents’ (Collier 2006) or
‘unearned income’ (Moore 1998), given that they mostly accrue to governments
and they are generated by foreign actors (oil companies or donor agencies). Their
nature, and the fact that they are often substantial, may reduce the government’s
need for directly taxing its citizens, and therefore expand executive authority at the
expense of political accountability (Moore 2004). The so-called ‘resource curse’
has been widely documented, showing that resource-rich countries are often
marred by authoritarian regimes, corruption and inefficiency, and poor growth and
macroeconomic imbalances (Rosser 2006). The presence of resource revenues,
then, interacts in important ways with political and budget institutions and processes
to determinate budget outcomes.
Aid flows have often been considered similar to oil (Moore 1998; Therkildsen
2002; Collier 2006), leading to worries that aid dependency can have a negative
impact on budget governance. In the words of Auty (2007:1), ‘foreign aid shares
with natural resource rent […] the property of being a large revenue stream that is
detached from the economic activity that generates it, and elicits political contests
for its capture’. International aid agencies provide financing for a large proportion
of public spending in a number of low income countries, through modalities such
as projects, budget support and debt relief. At the same time, however, they seek
to improve budget governance by enhancing the state’s capacities to plan, prioritise
and manage public resources to strengthen fiscal performance and achieve long
term poverty reduction. This is not true for natural resource revenues, which
accrue directly to governments with no additional conditions and little accountability.
As a matter of fact, as we will see below in more detail, the evidence on the
potential negative impact of aid is less clear cut than in the case of resource rents.
As Collier argues, contrary to resource rents, ‘aid comes with various donor-
imposed mechanisms of scrutiny, which may […] substitute for reduced pressure
from citizens’ (2006: 1485). Nevertheless, the fact that aid flows can shift the
balance of power within government agencies to increase the executive’s
discretionary authority and spending power, while at the same time distorting
domestic accountability mechanisms (de Renzio 2006) should not be overlooked.
Ultimately, the degree to which natural resource rents, and to a certain degree aid
flows, impact on budget governance will probably depend on their interplay with
other characteristics of the political and institutional environment described in this
section.
Figure 2.1 elaborates on existing work on the politics of the policymaking process
in Latin America to illustrate the interaction between institutions, actors and
resources during the budget process (Spiller and Tomassi 2003; Stein et al. 2008).
According to the framework, budget outcomes are the result of the presence of
formal and informal dynamics shaping the nature of the budget process (I). The
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nature of the budget process, in turn, depends on the nature of political and
budgetary institutions (from electoral systems to rules governing budget
transparency and access to information), and on the volume and modalities of
revenue flows from aid or natural resource rents (II). Therefore, political actors in
low income and lower middle income countries have incentives to produce
improved budget outcomes only under a specific constellation of factors.
Furthermore, the framework acknowledges and implicitly recognises that there are
national, sub-national and international stakeholders affecting the outcomes of the
budget process.
Figure 2.1 The budget governance framework
Source: Adapted from Spiller and Tomassi (2003); Stein et al. (2008).
2.3 Political institutions
For the past two decades, political economy approaches have made an explicit
effort to understand the roles and incentives of political actors and their contribution
to the policy process given a set of formal institutional constraints (Alt and Lowry
1994; Persson and Tabellini 2001). The underlying premise is that electoral and
party system rules determine different configurations under which policy coalitions
are formed. In the budget process, political agents would seek to maximise the
gains from cooperation (i.e. seeking budget allocations for their constituencies),
while minimising the associated costs (i.e. avoiding tax burdens or transferring
them to non constituents). Political institutions can also play a role in creating
(dis)incentives for cooperation (i.e. before or after new elections), or in
implementing and enforcing policy agreements over time (i.e. through the roles of
the bureaucracy and an independent judiciary).
Broadly speaking, political institutions in democratic settings can be grouped under
two governance models. The first type, emanating from a Hobbesian tradition,
seeks to privilege the will of ‘the majority of the people’, by delegating decision-
making abilities to a centralised authority. The alternative or consensus model,
emerging from a social contract tradition, defends the principle that decision
making should be made by ‘as many people as possible’, therefore privileging the
notion of representation over resoluteness (Lijphart 1999). Translating this
distinction to the study of fiscal outcomes, findings suggest that a greater
concentration of political authority in the hands of the executive, tends to produce
more disciplined budget outcomes than institutions which favour greater dispersion
of power (Alesina and Perotti 1994, 1996; Alesina et al. 1999; Hallerberg and
Marier 2004; Scartascini and Olivera 2003). For example, majoritarian electoral
rules tend to reduce the participation of diverse policy actors while making elected
officials more accountable for policy decisions adopted (Persson and Tabellini
2001). Similarly, two party systems tend to produce greater fiscal discipline than
multiparty democracies since they contribute to reduce the bargaining costs of
assembling budget coalitions. In the context of a presidential regime, a two party
system tends to induce lower fiscal spending and more fiscal discipline compared
to instances of unified government (Alt and Lowry 1994). Political cooperation
around budget outcomes is negatively influenced by the presence of electoral
cycles. Vote seeking politicians tend to favour greater government spending before
an electoral event, and postpone fiscal adjustment until after the elections (Drazen
2000; Persson and Tabellini 2005: 253). A non-trivial consequence is that budget
coalitions produce sustainable outcomes over time when individual politicians
enjoy lengthier mandates.
Exploring beyond the sphere of democratic institutions alone, there are certain
state capacities that have an impact on the nature of the budget process and the
quality of budget outcomes. The first relates to the State’s capacity to effectively
carry out budget decisions, usually through a professional, independent and merit-
based civil service. A highly skilled bureaucracy within the line ministries, planning
office and tax authority can contribute to more transparent and efficient (well
targeted) budget outcomes. A closely related element is the extent to which the
state can monitor and enforce existing budget contracts, through a strong and
independent judiciary. Although many other agencies are actively involved in
monitoring and overseeing the implementation of budget outcomes, the judiciary
has a direct sanctioning role during the budget process and upholding the rule of
law. For example, a legal system that remains free from political influence has a
greater legitimacy to enforce fiscal responsibility laws and sanction defections. In
both cases, the presence of high corruption levels in a given country, for example
in the form of patronage-driven or rent-seeking networks, suggest that the state is
also poorly equipped to implement and enforce quality budget outcomes. The
impact of these political institutions and state capacities are further discussed and
operationalised in the following section, and empirically tested in later parts of the
paper.
2.4 Budget institutions
As Aaron Wildavsky noted in a seminal paper back in 1961, ‘perhaps the “study of
budgeting” is just another expression for the “study of politics”’ (Wildavsky 1961:
190). In this sense, budget institutions can be considered as that sub-set of political
institutions which shape and regulate the process of generating and allocating
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public resources for carrying out government functions broadly conceived. Budget
institutions therefore incorporate the formal system of actors involved in the budget
process, their respective roles, and the division of power and responsibilities that
determines how governments raise and spend funds. The main actors include the
executive, from Cabinet to specific ministries and agencies, the legislative,
including its committees dealing with budgets, sectors and public accounts, and
other accountability actors including inspection and audit institutions, civil society
actors and the media.
Existing work has illustrated how specific budget rules that account for a more
hierarchical budget process contribute to greater fiscal discipline (Alesina et al.
1999; Scartascini and Filc 2005; Samuels 2003; Von Hagen 2002). These include,
for example, a greater level of centralisation of the budget making process in the
hands of the executive, the presence of caps on expenditure or constraints to limit
ability of parliaments to generate new spending lines, the elimination of off
budgetary items, and a greater level of budget transparency. At the same time,
however, research carried out on the role played by parliaments (Wehner 2004;
Wehner 2006) in the budget process highlights the important accountability function
that they perform, and how their impact depends on other characteristics of the
political and institutional environment in which they act.
Campos and Pradhan (1996) look at how institutional arrangements in different
countries affect incentives that govern the size, allocation and use of budgetary
resources, with the aim of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different
systems in terms of maintaining overall fiscal discipline, allocating resources to
priority areas, and achieving operational efficiency. For the three low-income
African countries analysed (Ghana, Malawi and Uganda), they find that donors
have a strong influence on budget institutions. While providing positive incentives
for short-term fiscal discipline, donors imposed spending cuts that undermined
prioritisation and promoted fragmentation of budget systems through multiple
projects. The lack of adequate systems for transparency and accountability,
moreover, undermined the credibility of the budget and the predictability of flows
of resources to line agencies.
Another important factor shaping budget outcomes is the interplay of formal rules
and informal practices in budget processes, which is particularly pervasive in poor
countries with limited capacity and low levels of democratic consolidation (Rakner
et al. 2004). As noted in the DFID briefing note on ‘understanding the politics of
the budget’ (DFID 2007: 6), ‘what matters is the interaction between formal and
informal institutions, whether they support each other or neutralize each other’.
Despite various past attempts at characterising budget processes and institutions,
there exists no agreed framework for doing so. Recent comparative work, carried
out by a consortium of donors, has led to the definition of a framework for
assessing the performance of budget systems, based on a set of indicators. The
Performance Measurement Framework developed by the PEFA (Public
Expenditure and Financial Accountability) Secretariat identifies the critical
dimensions of performance of an open and orderly PFM system along a series of
dimensions, including: (a) credibility, (b) comprehensiveness and transparency,
(c) policy-based budgeting, (d) predictability and control in budget execution,
(e) accounting, recording and reporting, and (e) external scrutiny and audit.
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These dimensions focus on the technical and institutional basis for sound budget
governance, and can be useful in attempting to capture the complex inter-relations
depicted in our framework, assisting in building an understanding of the influence
of political dimensions on budget processes and outcomes, moving beyond mere
description to a consideration of the roles, interests and incentives of the different
actors involved in budget-making, and the ways in which they interact to determine
budget outcomes. PEFA assessments have been carried out in more than 60
countries since 2005, but their results still do not constitute a fully consistent and
comparable cross-country dataset.
2.5 Aid, resource rents and the budget process
Aid dependency
Aid dependency has been defined in a number of ways (Lensink and White 1999;
Riddell 1996; Lancaster and Wangwe 2000). According to Brautigam (2000: 2), it
corresponds to ‘a situation in which a country cannot perform many of the core
functions of government, such as operations and maintenance, or the delivery of
basic public services, without foreign aid funding and expertise’. According to this
definition, aid dependency therefore goes beyond the measurement of the
percentage of national income or public expenditure financed by external
assistance, but incorporates issues linked to capacity and institutional strength.
Somewhat worryingly, and contrary to expectations that aid dependency is a
temporary phenomenon, the overall number of aid dependent countries (measuring
aid as a percentage of GNP) has seen an increasing trend since 1975, although it
seems to have levelled off in more recent years.
Academic research has focused extensively on aid’s impact on macroeconomic
variables such as economic growth and poverty levels, but aid’s impact on
governance and institutions has not yet received as much attention. While
Goldsmith (2001) finds a weak but positive linkage between aid and democracy
levels, much of the limited literature on this topic tends to find that aid has a
negative effect on governance in aid dependent countries. Knack (2001) and
Brautigam and Knack (2004), for example, show that higher levels of aid
dependency cause a deterioration in the quality of institutions. The work of Nicolas
van de Walle (1999, 2005) also documents how, especially in African countries,
countries that receive high levels of aid tend to see not only economic stagnation,
but also be fraught by political problems and government ineffectiveness.
Some of the main explanations for this negative impact can be found both at the
macro and micro level. At the macro level, aid provides a ‘soft budget constraint’,
limiting the accountability of the government to domestic actors and creating a
moral hazard problem, whereby governments receiving large amounts of aid may
engage in riskier fiscal behaviour, knowing they are likely to be bailed out. In
particular, the literature underlines two aspects of the linkages between aid
dependency and fiscal behaviour. The first aspect relates to aid’s impact on
domestic taxation, assuming that aid-dependent countries will use aid to reduce
their reliance on domestic taxation, preventing countries from reaping the
‘governance dividend’ that comes from the social contract that is implicit in the
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generation of tax revenues (Moore 2004). Yet, there is little clear evidence of a
negative impact of aid on taxation (McGillivray and Morrissey 2001; Gupta et al.
2003; Fagernas and Roberts 2004).
The second aspect has less to do with a direct impact of aid dependency on
government fiscal behaviour, but is linked to the difficulties that aid dependent
governments face when managing high and potentially increasing aid flows (see,
for example, Heller 2005; Gupta et al. 2006; Foster and Killick 2006). Large and
sudden increases in aid inflows in the form of foreign currency could provoke a
‘Dutch disease’ effect, causing an appreciation of the exchange rate and therefore
harming the export sector. When aid flows are in the form of loans, they can raise
concerns about debt sustainability. Aid flows are often unpredictable and volatile,
and can therefore negatively influence macroeconomic stability, by triggering
inflation, interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. At the micro-institutional level,
aid can provide perverse incentives to avoid reforms, and undermine institutional
capacity through fragmented and uncoordinated interventions (Morss 1984; Knack
and Rahman 2004). In the words of Brautigam and Knack (2004: 260),
First, the way large amounts of aid are delivered can weaken institutions
rather than build them. This can happen through the high transaction costs
that accompany aid, the fragmentation that multiple donor projects and
agendas promote, problems of ‘poaching,’ obstruction of opportunities to
learn, and the impact of aid on the budget process. Less directly, but just as
important, high levels of aid can create incentives that make it more difficult to
overcome the collective action problems involved in building a more capable
and responsive state and a more effective foreign aid system.
As indicated, budget systems are among the governance areas most prone to
some of these negative effects. Large proportions of donor funding are kept ‘off-
budget’, and therefore are not transparent and accountable, rendering the
allocation of resources according to priorities more difficult, and creating a parallel
‘bargaining arena’ separate from the budget process. Given the large number of
projects and programmes using parallel planning, budgeting, monitoring and
reporting mechanisms, and government capacity to ensure efficient and effective
delivery of public services is often undermined. Clearly, in this respect it is
important to distinguish among the different modalities that are used in delivering
aid. An important distinction is between so-called project and programme aid.
Programme aid modalities, including sector-specific and general budget support,
are partly intended to address some of the problems identified above, as they
channel resources directly through the domestic budget, therefore utilising
government capacity and government systems to implement activities. Project
assistance, on the other hand, has traditionally utilised parallel mechanisms,
thereby potentially exacerbating some of aid’s negative effects. Technical
assistance, another modality through which donors contribute capacity aimed at
strengthening government systems, has played an important part in supporting
budget reforms, but often with disappointing results (OED 2005; World Bank
2007).
Recent years have seen considerable efforts to address some of these issues, in
particular with the introduction of new programmatic aid modalities and with the
adoption of the specific indicators and targets enshrined in the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness. However, the effectiveness of such innovations still remains
disputed (IDD and Associates 2006; de Renzio 2006; World Bank 2006; OECD
2007).
Resource rents
Low-income countries endowed with non-renewable natural resources also have a
mixed track record when it comes to growth and development, with results that
are more often than not gloomy. Numerous studies (Warner and Alexander 2005;
Auty 2001; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier 2005; ODI 2006; and Rosser 2006)
have been undertaken to better understand why resource rich low-income countries
perform badly from both economic and social efficiency perspectives. One
dimension that is generating increasing attention relates to weak budget
governance records (Eifert et al. 2003; ODI 2006). Findings suggest that resource
revenues create disincentives for good budget governance and compound weak
government capacity to manage windfall revenues.
The presence of exogenously determined resource flows in the form of non-
renewable natural resources has a significant impact on the domestic budget
process. Some existing studies have tried to measure the impact of oil and other
natural resource flows for budget outcomes (Collier 2005; Mejía Acosta et al.
2006; Puente et al. 2006). Arguably, managing oil revenues well is more or less
the same as managing for other areas of the budget. Eifert et al. (2003) write that:
Revenue streams can finance productive physical and social investment or
fuel unsustainable consumption booms, which can lead to fiscal crises. On the
positive side the financing can be used to improve public welfare outcomes
through transparent distributional mechanisms, or they can create elite arenas
of competition, or they can underpin kleptocratic governments. Negative
outcomes associated with poor budget governance results because low
income oil rich countries tend to have opaque, highly politicised fiscal systems
that lack the checks and balances needed to ensure that resources are well
employed and to provide the fiscal flexibility needed to adjust spending in line
with changes in resources. On the other hand there are those governments
who remain in power only to accrue rents from the oil windfall and who
regardless do not even attempt to manage fiscal booms well e.g. the goal is
appropriation and not financial management. In the context of weak rule of
law, the presence of non-renewable resource revenues offer a wide margin
for looting and corrupt government practices.
Similar to aid dependent countries, the weakness of resource rich states would
also generate economic and political distortions that retard economic growth in the
long run, even if they contribute to short-run booms. Lower economic growth,
increased political instability and increasing poverty are other negative
consequences (ODI 2006). At the same time, debility can be caused by weak
government capacity, which can be compounded by the difficulties of managing
the macro implications of large influxes of foreign currency. Managing revenues to
reduce budget volatility and stabilise budgets is notoriously difficult even in
developed countries. A key issue for revenue management is to reduce the
possibility of Dutch disease, an economic phenomenon in which the discovery and
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exploitation of natural resources results in the deindustrialisation of a nation’s
economy. The value of the domestic currency rises and domestic spending patterns
and other internal resource allocation effects make tradable manufactured goods
and other tradable sectors, such as parts of the agricultural sector, less competitive.
Imports increase, exports decrease, productivity falls, and there is a shift away
from the tradable to the non-tradable sector, e.g. construction (ODI 2006).
Oil and mineral exporters who have windfall revenues therefore need to consider
a number of issues including: (i) how much to save for future generations, (ii) how
to achieve economic stability in the face of uncertain and widely fluctuating oil
revenues and avoid ‘boom-bust’ cycles, and (iii) how to ensure that spending is of
high quality, whether in the form of large investment projects, public consumption,
or subsidies (Eifert et al. 2003).
3 Measuring determinants of budget
governance
For the purpose of testing the impact of institutional variables on budget outcomes,
we have selected a cross section of aid and resource dependent countries at
different levels of economic development. The selected countries meet the
following criteria and fall above the following thresholds:
1. greater than 1,000,000 total population in 2005
2. equal to Low Income or Lower Middle Income World Bank country
classification (GNI per capita less than or equal to $3,465 in
2005)
3a. greater than 25.0 % of aid in total government expenditure (both mean
and median greater than threshold over 1995–2004), or (in
case data are not available)
3b. greater than 10.0 % of aid in GNI (both mean and median greater than
threshold over 1995–2004)
4. greater than 30.0 % of non-renewable resources (oil + gas + mineral +
ores) in total exports (both mean and median greater than
threshold over 1995–2004)
The dataset looks at 47 countries over a period of time between 1995 and 2006,
as detailed in Tables A1 and A3 in the Appendix; the unit of analysis is a country
per year for a total of 564 observations. From this universe, 12 of the countries
are resource dependent, 33 are aid dependent and 2 are both aid and resource
dependent. The average per capita income is US$1,094 in 2005. 26 of the 47
countries are HIPC countries. Five of the countries are from East Asia or the
Pacific, 6 are from Europe and Central Asia, 6 are from Latin America and the
Caribbean, 5 are from the Middle East and North Africa, 2 are from South Asia,
and the remaining 24 countries are from sub-Saharan Africa, by far the largest
group.
Although the notion of budget governance looks at the quality of budget outcomes
across different dimensions discussed in earlier sections of the paper, the empiri-
cal analysis focuses at this point on the combined impact of political institutions,
aid and resource rents on a country’s fiscal balances over time. The independent
variables are grouped along three dimensions: (i) political institutions and good
governance data, (ii) budget processes and institutions, and (iii) aid and resource
rent flows.
3.1 Political institutions and good governance
The amount and quality of data looking at democracy and governance indicators
has dramatically improved in the last decade. As data became more publicly
accessible, it has also improved the validation and methodological transparency
of existing indicators. Some of the most comprehensive datasets to measure
governance issues include the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufman,
Kraay and Mastruzzi 2006; and Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 2000), the
Global Competitiveness Report – an experts’ survey – (World Economic Forum
2004, 2005), and the Database on Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001).
Relevant measurements of democracy include the Polity IV dataset (Marshall,
Jaggers and Gurr 2004), the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties
(Freedom House), the Patterns of Democracy dataset (Lijphart 1999), the
Democracy and Development data (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi
2000), and the EIU (2006).
To assess the influence of electoral systems on the budget processes and
outcomes, we looked at two indicators. The competitiveness of participation
variable reports the degree of citizens’ participation in political activities:
competitive (5), transitional (4), factional (3), suppressed (2), repressed (1), or
does not apply (0) (Polity IV 2004). The other indicator controls for the specific
type of electoral system, depending on whether it is majoritarian (1), proportional
(2) or mixed (3) (Database of Political Institutions, as cited by the Quality of
Government Institute, Goteborg University 2006).
To measure the roles of political parties we look at the degree of political
competition, which could be: Repressed Competition (1), Restricted Competition (2),
Authoritarian-Guide Liberalisation of Restricted Competition (3), Uninstitutionalised
Competition (4), Gradual transition from Uninstitutionalised Competition (5),
Factional/Restricted Competition (6), Factional Competition (7), Political
Liberalisation: persistent overt coercion (8), Political Liberalisation: limited overt
coercion (9), and Institutionalised and Open Electoral Participation (10) (Polity IV
2004). The degree of political fragmentation is simply measured at this point by
structure of the party system: multi party (1), two party (2), or dominant party (3)
(Polity IV 2004).
1
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1 The conventional measure for party fragmentation would be the effective number of legislative or
electoral parties, but such data is inconsistently available for the countries of interest.
We provide data on the constraints on executive authority, as a proxy to measure
the executive’s influence and discretion in the decision making process: Unlimited
Authority (1), Intermediate Category (2), Slight to moderate limitations (3),
Intermediate Category (4), Substantial Limitations (5), Intermediate category (6),
and Executive party or subordination (7) (Polity IV 2004).
2
For the empirical
analysis we reversed the scale into a (strength of) ‘Executive authority’ index.
Other relevant indicators are collected to measure the capacity of the state to
promote sustained cooperation over time, enforce contracts, and produce efficient
outcomes. We include the Corruption Perceptions Index, which captures the
perceived levels of government corruption, as determined by expert assessments
and opinion surveys (Transparency International 2001–2006), and the composite
indicator on Control of Corruption in the WBGI. This database also includes a
measure of government effectiveness, which focuses on the civil services’ ability
to remain independent from political pressure, and formulate, implement and
sustain quality public services (Kauffman et al. 2006).
3
Finally, we measure the
presence of the rule of law, or the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
(Kaufmann et al. 2006).
3.2 Budget processes and institutions
Data on budget processes and institutions, which are key for the purposes of this
research, are the least readily available and reliable for a comparative cross-
country analysis. While in recent years more sources of data have become
available, often these have limited country coverage and do not stretch back in
time. After looking at the various indicators available (see Table A2 in the Appendix),
for the purposes of this paper we focused our attention on four indicators which
provided the best avenue for assessing two main dimensions of budget institutions:
their overall quality, looking at the way in which the budget process is organised,
including the quality of the bureaucracy in charge of budget making; and the
degree of transparency and accountability around the budget process.
The CPIA indicator on the ‘Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management’,
publicly available for all IDA countries for 2005 and 2006 only, rates countries on a
1 to 6 scale, looking at the extent to which there is: (a) a comprehensive and
credible budget, linked to policy priorities; (b) effective financial management
systems to ensure that the budget is implemented as intended in a controlled and
predictable way; and (c) timely and accurate accounting and fiscal reporting,
including timely and audited public accounts and effective arrangements for follow
up. For practical purposes, this is the variable we use in our analysis, but we
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2 For future coding, an alternative assessment is the extent to which executives need to share power
with the legislative branch (parliamentarism), and the level of territorial decentralisation (federalism),
according to the Gerring, Thacker and Moreno theory of Centripetal governance (Teorell et al. 2008).
3 For future coding, a more detailed assessment that disaggregates bureaucracy’s career opportunities,
compensation and meritocratic recruitment is offered by Evans and Rauch (Teorell et al. 2008).
nevertheless report other indicators of budget institutions for which more data
collection is required in the future.
The ICRG indicator on ‘bureaucratic quality’, available for a large set of countries
and stretching back to 1980, rates countries from 0 to 4, with higher points given
to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern
without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services, are
somewhat autonomous from political pressure and tend to have an established
mechanism for recruitment and training.
The Open Budget Index developed by the International Budget Project is drawn
from a questionnaire with 122 questions on budget transparency and accountability,
including the nature of the budget process, the content of budget proposals,
access to budget information, legislative oversight and audit processes. It rates
countries from 0 to 100, and is available for 59 countries for 2006 only. Similarly,
the Global Integrity indicator on ‘budget processes’ looks at availability of budget
information and at the functioning of budget accountability mechanisms. It is
available for 43 countries for 2006 only, and again rates countries from 0 to 100.
All of the indicators above are based on so-called ‘expert opinions’, where
individual experts or groups of experts carry out an assessment based on a
common methodology, which then goes through a process of peer review in order
to validate the findings and ensure consistency and cross-country comparability.
For the four indicators above, the methodology can be considered reliable, except
for the ICRG indicator, for which little information on the detailed methodology was
available. Much more detailed, mostly qualitative information about budget
processes and institutions is available through more in-depth country case studies
such as HIPC Assessments, PEFA Assessments and Public Expenditure Reviews.
These are not very well suited for cross-country analysis, but would provide a
wealth of useful information for country case studies.
3.3 Resource dependency indicators
Data on aid are mostly collected through the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the OECD, which keeps a database of aid flows stretching back to 1960.
While this is an internationally recognised and widely used database, it has the
downside of including only limited information on multilateral flows to recipient
countries, and its treatment of aid sub-categories is not always straightforward and
fully reliable. The three indicators that were collected for this paper are specified
below.
Aid dependency ratios. Aid dependency can be defined in a number of ways. The
two most widely used indicators include net Official Development Assistance (ODA)
as a percentage of Gross National Income (GNI) and net ODA as a percentage of
total government expenditure. Following Brautigam (2000), countries that have
received average (and median) net ODA flows of more than 10 per cent of Gross
National Income (GNI) over the period 1995–2004 are considered aid-dependent
for the purposes of this study. As we are interested in the impact of aid dependency
on budget governance, where available, we use a cut-off point of 25 per cent of
total government expenditure instead. We use the average and median over ten
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years because both the volume and the long-term nature of aid dependency
contribute to shape the institutional environment that we are interested in analysing.
Programme aid as per cent of total aid. We are interested in capturing the share of
aid that is channelled using government systems, as this isolates aid components
that are meant to strengthen domestic institutions by not bypassing them. There
are different aid modalities that fall within the programme category. Balance of
payments support, General Budget Support (GBS) and debt relief are the three
main modalities in which we are interested, as they provide substantially untied
support to the government budget. Certain kinds of sector support (e.g. SWAPs)
would also fall within this broad category, but their varied nature and scattered
reporting means it is difficult to gather reliable information. The DAC CRS database
does have specific items for programme aid as a whole and some of its sub-
components. Figures on GBS, however, are not necessarily very reliable, given
the different definitions that different donor countries use in defining what counts
as budget support. Moreover, the DAC data are only gradually catching up with
some of the shifts in the debate which happened over the past few years.
Donor fragmentation. Another important explanatory variable which we include is
the degree to which donor activities are fragmented, as this is likely to have an
impact on government capacity and on the significance and institutional strength
of the budget process. Following a number of authors (Moore et al. 2006; Knack
and Rahman 2004; and Roodman 2006), and using the DAC aid database, we
include a measure of donor fragmentation based on the Herfindahl Index, which
corresponds to the sum of the squared shares of total aid received by each
country in each year for each donor.
Natural resource dependency. Resource dependency can be measured by three
primary methods: (i) non-renewable natural resources as a share of GDP, (ii)
share of non-renewable resources in exports and (iii) share of revenue from non-
renewable natural resources in total state revenue. For the purposes of this paper
we focus on the second and the third measures. The data can be found in the
World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset compiled by the World Bank.
4 Some preliminary findings
The availability and reliability of data has been a consistent challenge for the
thorough testing of the statistical models. Thus, the reported preliminary results on
the political determinants of budget outcomes must be interpreted with caution.
The analysis uses STATA’s panel-corrected standard error estimation to address
conventional problems associated with the use of cross-country pooled time
series data.
4
We have controlled for the possibility of autocorrelation across,
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4 The first issue is the potential presence of heteroskedasticity in the data, i.e. the error processes may
differ from country to country; secondly, the error terms might be contemporaneously correlated, that is, the
errors in one country at a specific time point might be correlated with errors in another country at the same
time point; and thirdly, the danger of serial autocorrelation within countries (Harrinvirta and Mattila 2001: 509).
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rather than serially within panels or contemporaneously in the whole sample.
5
To
further decrease the possibility of multicollinearity, we have standardised the
independent variables (by subtracting the mean from each data point in
continuous variables and recoding categorical variables around zero). The next
section reports regressions results on fiscal balances as a proxy for budget
sustainability. The following section discusses the relevance of further testing
alternative models to evaluate the efficiency of budget allocations and the
importance of budgetary institutions on fiscal performance, and highlights the
need for country-level case study work to complement cross-country statistical
analysis.
4.1 Budget governance and fiscal discipline
The set of models looks at the combined impact of political institutions, aid and
resource rents on a country’s fiscal balance (see Appendix Table A4). Some
political variables such as citizens’ participation or the level of party fragmentation
(not reported) have a very weak or non significant impact on fiscal performance.
Model 1 shows that greater levels of executive influence or autonomy in the
decision making process (i.e. fewer constraints on the use of executive power)
have a negative impact on fiscal balances. This finding challenges the conventional
wisdom derived from OECD countries that executives with greater authority over
the budget process are associated with greater fiscal discipline. In the case of low
and lower middle income countries, where accountability mechanisms are often
weaker, unconstrained executive authority may be actually counterproductive for
fiscal discipline.
6
In the context of unchecked strong executives, therefore, a
greater influence of foreign aid appears to have a backlash effect on fiscal
discipline.
Model 2 illustrates the other side of the story: it suggests that a greater degree of
political competition (more institutionalised and transparent) is significantly
associated with better fiscal performance. Not surprisingly, the degree of political
competition is strongly and inversely correlated with executive authority (r = -0.63),
thus the presence of a political opposition effectively appears to counteract
discretionary executive power. This effect remains especially valid for low income
countries. The negative impact of other factors, including rule of law and aid levels,
on fiscal surpluses remains unchanged.
Model 3 looks at budget performance in aid and resource dependent countries.
The most interesting finding is that aid flows and resource revenues have opposite
effects on budget performance; while a larger share of non renewable resource
revenues has a positive and significant impact on fiscal balances, the model
suggests that greater levels of aid have the opposite effect. The significance and
5 The observed results were comparable with those obtained by running a robust OLS regression. Not
reported here, we also tested fixed-effects and lagged DV specifications with no significant
improvements to the robustness of the models.
6 Paradoxically here, a greater presence of the rule of law appears to be associated with fiscal deficits,
but this might be due to the inverse correlation between executive authority and rule of law.
direction of this impact also appears to be relatively independent of other factors –
and interactions – such as corruption (not reported in the model), or the quality of
the bureaucracy in a given country. Most interestingly, the presence of political
competition in resource rich countries appears to have the opposite effect on fiscal
balances: a more competitive political arena has a strong and significant impact on
fiscal deficits, perhaps because the abundance of natural resources encourages
rentier behaviour from opposition parties.
4.2 Directions for further research
The reported models begin to show the combined impact of political players and
institutions on budget outcomes. The variables analysed (such as executive
power or political competition), however, are mainly associated with the budget
approval stage. More work is needed to collect relevant data to differentiate the
factors that influence revenue collection – especially tax revenue – from those
affecting government spending, especially in aid recipient and natural resource
dependent countries.
Measuring performance on budget outcomes using fiscal balance as the only
dependent variable also constitutes a significant limitation of this paper. As
highlighted above, the use of further measures linked to the effectiveness of public
spending, looking at both resource allocation and impact, would add much more
depth and relevance to the analysis. For this purpose, given the limitations of the
existing time-series dataset for the Human Development Index, measures that
would need to be collected and used as alternative dependent variables could
include data on education, health or infrastructure, for example, looking at both
levels of spending and outcome indicators. For outcome indicators, however, the
usual issue of attribution needs to be highlighted, as changes in health outcomes,
for example, might be due to a number of factors that have little to do with
changes in public spending.
Another potential extension of this work includes looking at the impact of political
variables on the representativeness, coherence and credibility of budgets. While it
would be problematic to include these further dimensions as dependent variables
in the context of this paper, given that they somewhat overlap with one of the
independent variable used above (‘budget institutions’), we still think that it’s
necessary to keep them in mind for purposes of further research. In particular,
country case studies can generate additional data for these dimensions which is
not readily available at a cross-country level, allowing us to move beyond the
limited view of budgets as purely fiscal instruments to more developmental ones,
and from quantitative to more qualitative aspects of budget processes and
outcomes.
The rationale for case study work is strengthened when taking a closer look at
individual countries which reveal some interesting inconsistencies when CPIA
scores are compared with historical fiscal performance. Burkina Faso, for example,
has the worst fiscal deficits for a country with an average CPIA score above 4. Mali
is another example of a country with a high CPIA score and a professionalised
bureaucracy, but with negative fiscal performance. These institutional discrepancies
that translate as empirical outliers suggest the existence of non institutional factors
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that are not captured by cross national data that may in fact shape the workings
of the budget process. While there is plenty of evidence showing that conventional
rules or ‘parchment institutions’ (Carey 2000) affect the budget process in
important ways, there are no systematic theoretical explanations for these
irregularities. The cross national data is a useful starting point to chart deviations
from theoretical expectations. Further case study work is needed to uncover the
incentives that budget players have to disregard institutionalised budget
procedures for political gain, or needed to explore the political motivations that
move budget players to disregard formal budget procedures, and how do budget
coalitions occur despite the absence of constraining legal frameworks.
5 Summary and conclusions
This working paper is a preliminary effort to address some existing conceptual,
theoretical, methodological and empirical gaps in the study of the politics of budget
processes in aid- and resource-dependent countries. This work makes three main
contributions to the field. Firstly, the paper has relied on a large-scale data
collection effort of cross-country time series data on political and budgetary
institutions, aid flows and resource rents in aid-dependent and resource-rich
countries, which created a panel dataset which includes variables for 47 countries
for the period 1995–2006.
Secondly, it puts forward and empirically tests a comprehensive theoretical
framework for budget governance that looks at the independent and combined
impact of political institutions, budget processes and rents from aid or natural
resources on budget outcomes, defined as sustainable fiscal balances. The
analysis finds that, contrary to established findings for rich countries, politically
uncontested executive authority has counterproductive effects on fiscal balances
in the context of aid dependent and resource rich countries. Moreover, increased
levels of political (partisan) competition have a moderating impact on the size of
deficits. Finally, aid flows and resource revenues seem to have opposite impacts
on fiscal performance, with resources improving the likelihood of obtaining fiscal
surpluses and aid flows increasing the likelihood of deficits. These results however,
must be interpreted with caution as we have only been able to measure the
impact of resource revenues as a share of total revenue, and aid flows as a share
of GNI, while more work needs to be done to collect data and gauge for the
impact of alternative sources of revenues – including tax revenues – and different
aid modalities. Nevertheless, for example, the findings point to the potential
importance of donors focusing on favouring stronger accountability mechanisms in
aid-dependent countries where donor-supported executive action goes largely
unchecked, and of taking the possible negative impacts of aid dependency more
seriously.
Thirdly, the paper points towards some interesting avenues for further research.
Rather than limiting the operationalisation of budget outcomes to fiscal balances,
it is important to improve the validity of our measurement by testing alternative
indicators of budget efficiency, using for example spending and outcome indicators
for key sectors such as health, education, nutrition or infrastructure. The same
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goes for other dimensions of budget outcomes related to issues such as
representativeness, coherence and credibility. A complementary approach is to
take a closer and more detailed look at cases where the existence of (favourable)
institutional conditions for budget governance does not correspond with existing
poor fiscal performance. Much of the analysis that can generate interesting and
policy-relevant insights into the politics of the budget process in aid- and resource-
dependent countries needs to be done at country-level, through case study work
which can uncover specific information and generate more detailed data in order to
generate the kinds of insights which can be useful in informing the policy choices
of donor agencies and other actors alike. In particular, it would be relevant to
measure the impact of different budgetary institutions on the quality of budget
processes, especially before and after the adoption of public finance reforms. This
is particularly important for donor agencies who increasingly support public
financial management reform in these countries, and rely on domestic systems to
deliver aid resources.
Another important conclusion of this study relates to data collection and availability.
The statistical relevance of some variables that confirm theoretical expectations
(such as the role of strong executive authority) are encouraging signs to motivate
further data collection and more rigorous testing. This points to the need to develop
greater efforts at collecting reliable and comprehensive data on a number of key
variables to study the politics of the budget process in low income countries. More
and better quality data is needed to measure the impact of budgetary institutions
on budget processes. Recent efforts have started to fill some of the gaps, but in a
very haphazard way, covering a limited number of countries and limited periods of
time, focusing on specific aspects of the budget process, and with methodologies
that often lack rigour and prevent comparability. This observation calls for a much
more serious and concerted effort, at international level, to collect information
which is detailed and comparable, through exercises that can be repeated over
time. In the case of Latin America, for example, budget surveys have generated a
wealth of information which is being utilised for both research and policy. The
same has not happened in Asia or in Africa, where most of our selected countries
are located.
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Appendix
Table A1 List of countries
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Aid +
Aid dependent countries Resource dependent resource dependent
Afghanistan Algeria Bolivia
Albania Azerbaijan Zambia
Armenia Cameroon
Bangladesh Colombia
Burkina Faso Congo. Rep
Burundi Ecuador
Cambodia Egypt, Arab Rep.
Chad Iran, Islamic Rep.
Congo, Dem. Rep. Kazakhstan
Eritrea Nigeria
Ethiopia Peru
Gambia, The Syrian Arab Republic
Ghana Trinidad and Tobago
Guinea-Bissau Yemen, Rep
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Liberia
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mongolia
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Niger
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Uganda
*El Salvador, Georgia and Sudan are excluded due to unreliable data
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Table A2 Data sources on budget processes and institutions
Different indicators are linked to budget
variables. These are: Fiscal Policy, Equity of
Public Resource Use, Quality of Budgetary
and Financial Management Systems,
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilisation, Quality
of Public Administration, Transparency,
Accountability and Corruption in the Public
Sector
Political risk ratings include dimensions on
corruption, democratic accountability and
bureaucratic quality.
The questionnaire contains 122 questions
on budget transparency and accountability,
including the nature of the budget process,
the content of budget proposals, access to
budget information, legislative oversight
and audit processes.
The Index includes scores on budget
processes and on government
accountability and corruption.
Survey includes questions on corruption
and government inefficiency.
The Transformation Index includes ratings
on government’s steering capability,
efficiency in resource use, degree of
consensus building and international
cooperation.
Assessment of country systems on budget
formulation, budget execution and budget
reporting compared to best practice
benchmarks.
The methodology covers the whole range
of issues linked to budgeting and public
finance management, including 3
indicators on donor performance related to
predictability and provision of information
to government.
The questionnaire includes detailed
information on budget processes and
institutions, including execution, accounting
and control.
Information on the legal framework for
PFM, decentralisation, the country’s fiscal
record and an assessment of PFM
reforms.
PERs look not only at PFM systems, but
also at budget policies and issues of
allocative and operational efficiency.
Database Source Coverage of budget issues
Country Policy and
Institutional
Assessment
International Country
Risk Guide
Open Budget Index
Global Integrity Index
Global Competitiveness
Survey
Bertelsmann
Transformation Index
HIPC AAPs
PEFAAssessments
Fiscal Transparency
ROSCs
Country Financial
Accountability
Assessments
Public Expenditure
Reviews
World Bank
Political Risk
Services
International
Budget Project
Global Integrity
World Economic
Forum
Bertelsmann
Foundation
IMF/WB
Various
IMF
World Bank
World Bank
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Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Gdp_pct Rate of economic growth World Bank 509 4.859311 7.154947 -31.3 106.28
Gdp_cap Per capita income World Bank 389 342.5017 223.732 56.52 996.95
debt_gdp Government debt World Bank 83 84.76422 54.15341 .21 247.38
(%GDP)
bal_gdp Fiscal deficit (%GDP) World Bank 284 -2.55331 3.781759 -19.48 21.98
Hdi Human Development UNDP 127 .5300787 .1543779 .25 .81
Index
Exp_gdp Government spending World Bank 291 18.23749 10.80544 0 42.83
(%GDP)
cit_par Citizen participation Polity IV 427 2.779859 1.073919 0 5
Elec_sys Electoral system Dbase of Pol. 90 1.711111 .8244091 1 3
Inst.
Pol_com Political competition Dbase of Pol. 257 .3378988 .2709522 0 .9
Inst.
Pol_com2 Political competition Polity IV 427 5.473068 2.752907 1 10
Pol_frag Political fragmentation Dbase of Pol. 355 .6521127 .4732563 0 1
Inst.
exec_inf Constraints on exec Polity IV 427 3.796253 1.754454 1 7
authority
corrupt Corruption Perceptions Transparency 201 2.687512 .7815682 0 5.3
Index International
corrupt2 Control of Corruption World Bank 322 -.7332919 .4151467 -2.13 .41
Gov_effe Government World Bank 327 -.6835168 .4582477 -1.96 .61
Effectiveness
Rul_law Rule of Law World Bank 329 -.7729179 .4677502 -2.37 .43
Cpia_bud CPIA Budget Indicator World Bank 36 3.208333 .6587325 1.5 4.5
Bur_qual Bureaucratic Quality ICRG 395 1.376608 .7496826 0 3
open_bud Open Budget Index IBP 21 31.85714 16.68918 5 77
Bud_acc GII Budget Processes GII 17 62.85882 15.86474 36.8 89.1
Indicator
Aid_gni Aid dependency World Bank 461 12.7798 12.25824 -.08 98.54
(ODA/GNI)
Aid_exp Aid dependency (ODA/ World Bank 133 43.61857 52.9234 0 319.33
government expenditure)
prog_aid Programme aid (% total OECD/DAC 363 20.97463 19.31104 0 93.49
ODA)
Don_frag Donor Fragmentation OECD/DAC 363 15.57857 10.48097 6.03 90.19
Index
Nnr_rev Resource dependency IMF 87 47.25874 20.80486 1.98 84.86
(% revenue)
Nnr_exp Resource dependency World Bank 109 68.01248 23.48861 14.69 99.67
(% exports)
Table A3 Variable codebook and summary statistics
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Table A4 Political determinants of budget governance
DV: Budge Balance (as a share of GDP)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Executive Influence -0.547**
(.29)
Political Competition .34** -.24**
(.17) (.10)
Rule of Law -2.34** -1.96**
(1.18) (1.04)
Rule of Law* -0.04
Exec. Influence (.56)
Low income Countries 1.62* -.810
(.94) (1.05)
Non renewable .06***
Resource (.02)
(% total exports)
Non renewable -.100**
Resource* Low Income (.04)
countries
Aid Levels -0.29*** -.34*** -.04
(as % of GNI) (.06) (.76) (.05)
Quality of the Bureaucracy .014
(0.69)
Intercept -4.10*** -5.31*** -1.90***
(.42) (.84) (0.63)
N 200 198 58
R2 0.258 0.292 0.348
All standard errors are heteroskedastic panel-corrected assuming no serial or contemporaneous
autocorrelation. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as follows:
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1
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